Liquidity Effects on Travel and Tourism Stocks following Global Financial Crises by Gregoriou, Andros & Liasidou, Sotiroula
Journal of Hospitality Financial Management 
The Professional Refereed Journal of the International Association of Hospitality Financial 
Management Educators 
Volume 27 Issue 2 Article 5 
2019 
Liquidity Effects on Travel and Tourism Stocks following Global 
Financial Crises 
Andros Gregoriou 
University of Brighton 
Sotiroula Liasidou 
Cyprus University of Technology 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/jhfm 
Recommended Citation 
Gregoriou, Andros and Liasidou, Sotiroula (2019) "Liquidity Effects on Travel and Tourism Stocks 
following Global Financial Crises," Journal of Hospitality Financial Management: Vol. 27 : Iss. 2 , Article 5. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7275/tn8k-ck95 
Available at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/jhfm/vol27/iss2/5 
This Refereed Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Hospitality Financial Management by an authorized editor of 
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu. 
© 2019 International Association of Hospitality Financial Management Education
THE JOURNAL OF HOSPITALITY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
2019, VOL. 27, NO. 2, 98–108
https://doi.org/10.7275/tn8k-ck95
CONTACT: Address correspondence to Andros Gregoriou, Brighton Business School, University of Brighton, Mithras House, Brighton, BN2 4AT, 
England. Email: a.gregoriou@brighton.ac.uk.
Liquidity Effects on Travel and Tourism Stocks following Global Financial Crises
Andros Gregoriou
Brighton Business School, University of Brighton, Brighton, England
Sotiroula Liasidou
Department of Hotel and Tourism Management, Cyprus University of Technology, Limassol, Cyprus
ABSTRACT
This paper explores liquidity effects following the global financial crises between 2007 and 2009 for 
25 stocks listed on the Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index. We find evidence of a sustained increase 
in the liquidity of the stocks as a result of the financial crises. The empirical findings are consistent 
with the information cost/liquidity hypothesis, which states that investors demand a lower premium 
for holding stocks with relatively more available information. Our results suggest that the travel and 
tourism industry is no longer considered a luxury item. On the contrary, it appears to be more of 
a necessity to stimulate business and happiness for firms and individuals, respectively, in times of 
financial turmoil.
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1.0 Introduction
The global financial crises (2007– 2009), referred to 
by the media as the credit crunch, is a major cause of 
the current recession the world is facing. In a time of 
recession, we would expect the tourism industry to 
suffer significantly. When money is tight, business 
and leisure travel are dramatically reduced for all 
consumers because of company profits and individ-
uals’ disposable income falling to considerably low 
levels. However, according to the United Nations 
World Tourism Organization, the key trends in 
2010 appear to contradict the traditional view that 
tourism falls during times of financial crises. This 
is due to the fact that international tourism arriv-
als increased by 6.6% from 2009– 2010. In addition, 
tourism receipts reached $919 billion worldwide in 
2010, up from $851 billion in 2009.
An additional aftermath of the financial crisis on 
tourism, apart from the increase in tourism arriv-
als, was a change in traveling behavior, perceptions, 
and attitudes of the travelers with the need of differ-
ent tourism products (Alegre & Pou, 2016; Bronner 
& Hoog, 2016; De Vita & Kyaw, 2016). The direct 
response of the destinations was to develop the per-
tinent products in the “form” of multifaceted activ-
ities with dynamic experiences as required by the 
various market segments (Lopes, Abrantes, & Kas-
tenholz, 2014).
Given the contradiction between conventional 
financial theory and the evidence provided by the 
United Nations World Tourism Organization stated 
above and in more detail in Section 2 of this arti-
cle, along with the lack of empirical literature in this 
very important issue, we feel that a comprehensive 
analysis of the tourism industry around the financial 
crises period is a vital piece of research that should 
be undertaken. We have attempted to bridge this gap 
in the literature by examining the market liquidity 
effects of the Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index 
before and after the financial crises.
Our findings show a significant increase in 
the liquidity of the travel and tourism stocks after 
the financial crises. In addition, we show that the 
increase in liquidity is maintained over three- 
month post- financial crises trading. Therefore, as 
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the increase in liquidity spans over a three- month 
period, we can say that there is a long- term improve-
ment in the liquidity of the travel and tourism firms 
after the financial crises.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the 
following way. The next section provides a review of 
the previous literature concerning travel and tour-
ism during periods of financial turbulence. Section 
3 describes the data and the methodology. Section 
4 presents the analysis of both the short- term and 
long- term effects of trading before and after the 
financial crises for travel and tourism index stocks. 
Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2.0 Literature review
2.1 Tourism in economic turbulence
As a result of the global financial crises, demand 
changed for various products and services in the 
travel and tourism industry (see Papatheodorou & 
Pappas, 2017; Smeral, 2010). The economic reces-
sion, especially in the United States and Europe, 
had a significant impact on tourism industry con-
sumption habits because of lower income and high 
rates of unemployment (De Vita & Kyaw, 2016). 
The immediate aftermath was that traveling habits 
became more short- haul, intra- regional and domes-
tic (World Tourism Organization and International 
Labour Organization, 2013; Sheel, 2008). The inter-
relation of economic down turn and the impact 
on tourism was the discussion in a vast number of 
research papers (see among others, Alegre & Pou, 
2016; De Vita & Kyaw, 2016; Bronner & Hoog, 2016; 
Alegre, Mateo, & Pou, 2013; Culiuc, 2014; Papa-
theodorou, Rosselló, & Xiao, 2010; Ritchie, Amaya 
Molinar, & Frechtling, 2010). The financial crisis 
creates opportunities for research especially on the 
behavior of consumers as a result of the new finan-
cial regulations that have been put in place (Sheldon 
& Dwyer, 2010).
Additionally, companies must readjust their strat-
egies to accommodate both their and the consum-
ers’ requirements according to the new economic 
situation (Bronner & Hoog, 2016). Bernini and 
Cracolici (2016) find that tourism as a consumption 
good varies in terms of the way it can be acquired 
and experienced. At the same time, tourism sup-
pliers produce products that offer what is primarily 
needed by the various consumer groups (Liasidou, 
2013). Undoubtedly, tourism is becoming an activity 
to the majority of the people in advanced economies 
basically because of the plethora of opportunities 
in the tourism marketplace. Nowadays, holidays 
can be easily booked online (Ukpadi & Karjaluoto, 
2017) and at the same time there is a choice of var-
ious transportation modes with the most notable 
example to be the appearance of the Low Cost Car-
riers (Liasidou, 2017; Alderighi, Cento, Nijkamp, & 
Rietveld, 2012). Additionally, there is a variety of 
choices in the accommodation sector at any price 
range and service quality (Xiang, Magnini, & Fesen-
maier, 2015).
Historically, tourism was referred to as the Grand 
Tour and was the privilege of the members of aris-
tocracy. The boom of the tourism industry happened 
after the end of the Second World War with the phe-
nomenon of mass tourism. Thus, tourism became 
an activity affordable to most people in Europe and 
the United States. The emerging economies, namely 
the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa), contribute to the tourism industry both in 
supply and demand, with travelers seeking authen-
ticity through tourism activities that create memo-
rable experiences. Bernini and Cracolici (2016) find 
that tourism as a consumption good varies in terms 
of the way it can be acquired and experienced. At 
the same time, tourism suppliers produce products 
that offer what is primarily needed by the various 
consumer groups (Liasidou, 2013). The next part 
considers the methods of the study.
3.0 Methods
3.1 Data
We analyze the 25 companies listed on the Dow 
Jones Travel and Tourism Index before and after the 
financial crises. The 25 companies in our data sam-
ple are shown in Table 1. We only analyze 25 compa-
nies because they are the largest travel and tourism 
companies in the world that dominate the industry, 
reflected by their inclusion in the Dow Jones Travel 
and Tourism Index. The financial crisis consists of 
186 event days (30% of working days) between Jan-
uary 1, 2007, and April 30, 2009. Therefore, in our 
event study the pre- (post-)financial crises date is 
before (after) January 1, 2007 (April 30, 2009). Our 
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final dataset consists of companies that satisfied the 
following criteria:
a) The company is not involved in a merger that 
immediately preceded the event date.
b) The company has available historical data on 
the Dow Jones for a period of 90 days before 
and after the event date.
c) The common stock of a company does not 
exhibit a split in the period of 90 days before 
and after the event date.
Criteria A–C are applied to minimize the impact 
of alternative events that may occur during the same 
time period. Once the criteria are applied, we yield a 
sample of all the 25 companies. For these companies, 
daily stock returns, daily trading volume and shares 
outstanding are obtained from the Dow Jones. Like 
previous market microstructure studies (see among 
others, Hegde & McDermott, 2003; Gregoriou & 
Ioannidis, 2006) we obtain the number of analysts 
that follow the stocks from the Institutional Brokers’ 
Estimates System International (I/B/E/S) database.
For robustness, we implement two alternative 
measures of liquidity costs, the relative and effective 
bid- ask spread. The relative spread is defined as the 
ask price minus the bid price, divided by the mid-
price (the average of the bid and ask prices). As Lee 
and Ready (1991) point out, the problem with the 
relative spread is that it can be regarded as an inaccu-
rate measure of liquidity because many trades occur 
at prices within the bid and ask price. Therefore, in 
order to obtain a more accurate measure of the mar-
ket liquidity, we follow the methodology in Heflin 
and Shaw (2000) and Hegde and McDermott (2003) 
and compute the effective bid- ask spread. The effec-
tive bid- ask spread is computed as twice the absolute 
value of the difference between the transaction price 
and the midprice in effect at the time of the trade.
We begin our empirical estimates with the use of an 
event study surrounding the two event days concern-
ing the pre- and post-financial crises trading of the 25 
companies listed on the Dow Jones Travel and Tour-
ism Index. We define the event (i.e., day 0) as January 
1, 2007, and April 30, 2009 for the pre- and post- 
financial crises trading period. We use the traditional 
market model which was first established by Brown 
and Warner (1985) and was subsequently used by 
most previous research on event studies (Hegde & 
McDermott, 2003; Denis, McConnell, Ovtchinnikov, 
& Yu, 2003; Gregoriou & Ioannidis, 2006).
The market model involves a procedure with a 
value- weighted market index and market model 
parameters estimated over the time period 90 days 
before and after the event date in order to calculate 
excess returns around the event dates for each secu-
rity. The excess returns obtained from the market 
model are aggregated through event time to obtain 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). We then aggre-
gate the CARs across securities in order to compute 
the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR).
One potential shortcoming of the market model 
is that the ACAR is computed assuming indepen-
dent estimates for each firm. However, as Masse, 
Hanrahan, Kushner, and Martinello (2000) point 
out this method is problematic when the events 
are clustered, as they are in our study. The prob-
lem occurs because all 25 firms are exposed to the 
financial crises the same time period. This means 
that the abnormal returns calculated for each firm 
are unlikely to be independent. Instead there will be 
contemporaneous correlation of the returns across 
Table 1. List of the Companies in Our Data Sample
Number Company name
1 Expedia
2 Travelocity
3 Price Line Group
4 American Express Travel
5 Carlson Wagonlit Travel
6 HRG North America
7 AAA Travel
8 BCD Travel
9 Corporate Travel Management
10 Travel and Transport
11 Altour
12 Direct Travel
13 World Travel Incorporation
14 Omega World Travel
15 JTB Americas Group
16 World Travel Holding
17 ATG Travel
18 Vision Travel Solutions
19 Adelman Travel Group
20 Travizon
21 Worldview Travel
22 cheapcarribbean.com
23 Fox World Travel
24 Shorts Travel Management
25 Travel Planners International
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firms, resulting in t- statistics on average abnormal 
returns being biased away from zero (Brown & War-
ner, 1985). Beneish (1991) and Cable and Holland 
(2000) suggest that a solution to such a problem is 
to construct an equally weighted portfolio of the 25 
firms in our sample and to assess the average abnor-
mal performance at the portfolio level.
The portfolio does not suffer from contempora-
neous correlation, which implies that we can use the 
central limit theorem to derive its sampling distri-
bution and obtain reliable t- statistics for our study 
(Campbell, Lo, & MacKinlay, 1997). We compute 
the ACARs at both the individual firm level and the 
portfolio level. The results are quantitatively similar, 
so we only report the individual firm results.
4.0 Empirical results
4.1 Abnormal returns of tourism industry after the 
financial crises
In order to investigate the impact of short- term 
effects of the financial crises on the Dow Jones 
Travel and Tourism Index firms, we compute abnor-
mal returns and changes in liquidity around a five- 
day event window, [−5, +5]. We utilize the standard 
event methodology outlined in the previous section 
of the paper for each stock in our sample for each 
event day. The results for the event window [−5, +5] 
are presented in Panel A of Table 2.
Panel A indicates that stock returns of the Dow 
Jones Travel and Tourism Index firms are affected by 
the financial crises. Significant positive AARs (Aver-
age Abnormal Returns) persist over the 11- day event 
window, with the largest average return of 0.88% 
occurring on the first date after the financial crises 
(event day 1). The CAR from day −5 to +5 of 5.04% 
is distinguishable from zero with a t- statistic of 2.50. 
The short- term abnormal returns results suggest 
that positive excess returns are gained by investors 
on the Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index due to 
the financial crises.
If the financial crisis has improved the sustained 
liquidity of travel and tourism stocks, then we would 
expect the abnormal returns witnessed in Panel A 
of Table 1 to persist over time. In order to test this 
hypothesis, we compute the CAR of Dow Jones 
Travel and Tourism stocks over a three- month event 
window [0, +90] after the financial crises period. 
The results are presented in Panel B of Table 2. We 
observe that there are significant CARs for up to 90 
trading days following the financial crises. Therefore, 
from the results in Table 2 we can report evidence of 
permanent stock price increases in Dow Jones Travel 
and Tourism stocks after the financial crises.
4.2 Trading volume effects of financial crises on 
the tourism industry
To determine the possible presence of liquidity 
effects, we proceed with the analysis of the impact 
of the financial crises on the trading volume of the 
Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index. We test for the 
presence of abnormal trading volume in the event 
period by employing the following dummy variable 
panel fixed effects regression model.
Volumejt = αj + γt + ∑ Diβi + εj for j = 1,25 and t = –90,+5
–5
+5
 
(1)
Table 2. Abnormal Returns around Dow Jones Travel and 
Tourism Index Financial Crises Trading
The sample consists of 25 Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index 
firms that were available to be traded before and after the financial 
crises. Average Abnormal returns (AAR) are computed using the 
market model and the standard event study methodology. The 
estimation window for computing the market model parameters 
is the event time interval [−90, 90]. AAR is tested for significance 
using a t- statistic.
Panel A. Short- term abnormal returns
Event Day AAR (%) t-test H0: AAR=0
−5 0.14 2.30**
−4 0.31 2.25**
−3 0.36 2.18**
−2 0.62 2.65**
−1 0.86 2.63**
0 0.42 3.24**
+1 0.88 3.01**
+2 0.64 2.67**
+3 0.39 2.20**
+4 0.30 2.16**
+5 0.12 2.09**
[−5, +5] 5.04 2.50**
Panel B. Long- term abnormal returns
Event Day AAR (%) t-test H0: AAR=0
[0, +10] 0.72 2.22**
[0, +20] 0.65 2.13**
[0, +30] 0.55 2.21**
[0, +60] 0.43 2.13**
[0, +90] 0.31 2.16**
** Significant at 5% level.
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Where Volumejt is the logarithm of trading volume 
for stock j at day t. αj captures the variation in trad-
ing volume across all the companies in our sample. 
γt captures the changes in trading volume per day 
that is common across all the companies in our sam-
ple. Di are dummy variables for each trading day in 
the event window [−5, +5]. The coefficients of the 
eleven dummy variables, βi capture the abnormal 
trading volume over the event window, [−5, +5]. εj is 
a random disturbance term with a mean of zero and 
a variance of σ2, αj, γt, and βi are parameters to be 
estimated. Equation 1 is estimated by a fixed effects 
panel estimator using the White (1980) heterosce-
dastic consistent covariance matrix. The results of 
Equation 1 can be seen in Panel A of Table 3.
The positive and significant sign of the 11 dummy 
variables confirms that there is a dramatic increase 
in trading volume in the tourism industry after 
the financial crises. For example, five days before 
the event (i.e., event day −5) the coefficient on the 
dummy β– 5 is 0.346 and significant with a t- statistic 
of 2.93. The abnormal volume continues to increase 
and reaches its peak on the day of the event (i.e., 
event day 0). On this event day β0 is 0.91 and highly 
significant with a t- statistic of 3.76, indicating that 
trading volume has substantially risen for the travel 
and tourism industry after the financial crises.
Following the financial crises, the abnormal vol-
ume decreases from its peak but continues to be 
positive and significant throughout the post-event 
period. The regression in Equation 1 also passes the 
normality test, suggesting that the abnormal volume 
empirical estimates are not due to possible outliers 
in the data. In addition, αj is significant showing that 
there are changes in trading volume across the 25 
Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index firms in our 
sample.
In order to analyze changes in the long-term trad-
ing volume of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index 
stocks preceding the financial crises, we construct 
a Post/Pre ratio of standardized trading volume 
in the post- crises period [0, +90] to the standard-
ized volume in the pre- crises period [0, −90]. The 
results of the long- term changes in trading volume 
are reported in Panel B of Table 3. We can see that 
the mean (median) Post/Pre ratio of standardized 
trading volume is 2.28 (2.21) with a corresponding 
t- statistic of 4.63. This finding suggests that after the 
Table 3. Trading Volume around Dow Jones Travel and 
Tourism Index Financial Crises Trading
Panel A. Short- term abnormal trading volume
The following panel fixed effects regression model is estimated to 
investigate the changes in trading volume surrounding the dates 
of the financial crises on 25 firms listed on the Dow Jones Travel 
and Tourism Index.
Volumejt = αj + γt + ∑ Diβi + εj for j = 1,25 and t = –90,+5
–5
+5
Where Volumejt is the logarithm of trading volume for stock j at 
day t. αj captures the variation in trading volume across all the 
companies in our sample. γt captures the changes in trading 
volume per day that is common across all the companies in our 
sample. Di are dummy variables for each trading day in the event 
window [−5, +5]. The coefficients of the eleven dummy variables, 
βi capture the abnormal trading volume over the event window, 
[−5, +5]. εj is a random disturbance term with a mean of zero and a 
variance of σ2, αj, γt , and βi are parameters to be estimated. NORM 
(2) is the p- value for the Jarque- Bera normality test.
Parameter Estimate t-statistic
αj 0.125 2.63**
γt 0.0034 2.23**
β– 5 0.346 2.93**
β–4 0.476 2.83**
β–3 0.584 2.26**
β–2 0.672 2.23**
β– 1 0.836 2.92**
 β0 0.91 3.76**
 β+1 0.84 2.32**
β+2 0.632 2.82**
β+3 0.532 2.76**
β+4 0.493 2.01**
β+5 0.282 2.90**
Adjusted R2 = 0.65
NORM (2) = 0.47
** Significant at the 5% level.
Panel B. Long- term trading impact of trading volume on 
Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index financial crises trading
The sample consists of 25 Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index 
firms that were traded before and after the financial crises. 
Standardized trading volume is defined as daily trading volume 
in shares divided by the total Dow Jones trading for the same day. 
Standardized trading volumes are computed for the pre- financial 
crises period [0, −90] and the post-financial crises period [0, +90]. 
The t-statistic is constructed to test the null hypothesis that the 
standardized trading volume is unchanged in the pre- financial 
crises period as compared with the post- financial crises period.
Variable Standardized trading volume
Mean (Pre- internet) 0.00657%
Mean (Post- internet) 0.0150%
Median (Pre- internet) 0.00652%
Median (Post- internet) 0.0144%
Mean (Post/Pre Ratio) 2.28
Median (Pre/Post Ratio) 2.21
t-test 4.63**
** Significant at 5% level.
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global financial crisis there has been a permanent 
rise in trading volume of the Dow Jones Travel and 
Tourism Index.
In the preceding section of the paper we attempt 
to explain the increase in the stock prices and the 
significant increase in aggregate trading volume 
of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism stocks, after the 
global financial crises, with the use of the informa-
tion cost/liquidity hypothesis.
4.3 Information cost liquidity hypothesis
The information hypothesis was first established 
by Van Horne (1970) in the context of new listings 
on the NYSE, stating that listing signals good news 
about firms’ future prospects. Since the work by Van 
Horne (1970), researchers such as Schleifer (1986), 
Dhillon and Johnson (1991), Beneish and Gardner 
(1995), Hegde and McDermott (2003) and Grego-
riou and Ioannidis (2006) have examined whether 
information about the investment appeal of a stock is 
provided by news of listing changes. They all report 
significant improvement in stock performance after 
inclusion in the index.
From the previous section, we discovered that 
there was an increase in trading volume when the 
25 Dow Jones Travel and Tourism firms were traded 
after the financial crises. As a result of the increase 
in trading volume, Dow Jones Travel and Tourism 
Index companies may receive more attention by 
analysts and investors, resulting in lower bid- ask 
spreads and higher market liquidity.
If after the financial crises, travel and tourism com-
panies are followed by increased scrutiny by analysts 
and investors, the firms’ information environment 
is richer and the trading will be more frequent, 
resulting in increased liquidity. In this section of the 
paper, we analyze whether there are changes in the 
information environments and the liquidity of the 
Dow Jones Travel and Tourism firms after the finan-
cial crises.
If changes in the Dow Jones Travel and Tourism 
Index before and after the financial crises are associ-
ated with changes in the information environment, 
the stock prices of the Dow Jones Travel and Tour-
ism Index firms adjust to reflect changes in future 
levels of available information.
In order to evaluate changes in the information 
environment of the Dow Jones Travel and Tour-
ism Index stocks before and after the financial cri-
ses, we analyze the analysts’ coverage of the stocks 
in the pre- crises and post- crises period. To analyze 
the long- term changes in the information environ-
ment of the stocks following the financial crises, we 
construct a “Post/Pre ratio” of the number of ana-
lysts that follow each stock in the post- crises period 
[0, +90] to the number of analysts that follow the 
stock in the pre- crises period [0, −90]. The results 
of the analysts’ coverage of the stocks are portrayed 
in Table 4.
From Table 3, we can see that the mean (median) 
Post/Pre ratio for the analysts’ coverage of Dow Jones 
Travel and Tourism Index stocks is 2.65 (2.99). The 
change is highly significant with a t- statistic of 3.70. 
The results suggest that there is a significantly richer 
information environment for Dow Jones Travel and 
Tourism Index stocks once they are traded online.
Given that Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index 
firms operate in a richer information environment 
after the financial crises, we proceed by analyzing 
whether the increased information environment of 
the stocks results in increased market liquidity in 
the manner predicted by Schleifer (1986), Dhillon 
and Johnson (1991), Beneish and Gardner (1995) 
and Gregoriou and Ioannidis (2006).
In order to analyze the impact of the financial cri-
ses on the short-term liquidity of Dow Jones Travel 
Table 4. Long- Term Impact on Analyst Coverage of Dow 
Jones Travel and Tourism Index Stocks Pre- and Post- 
Financial Crises Trading
The sample consists of 25 Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index 
firms that were traded before and after the financial crises. The 
number of analysts following the stock is the number of earning 
estimates as reported in the I/B/E/S summary data file. The number 
of analysts is computed for each stock for the pre- financial crises 
period [0, −90] and the post- financial crises period [0, +90]. The 
t-statistic is constructed to test the null hypothesis that the number 
of analysts following each stock is unchanged in the pre- financial 
crises period as compared with the post- financial crises period.
Variable Analyst coverage
Mean (Pre- internet) 1.2
Mean (Post- internet) 3.2
Median (Pre- internet) 1
Median (Post- internet) 3
Mean (Post/Pre Ratio) 2.65
Median (Pre/Post Ratio) 2.99
t-test 3.70**
** Significant at 5% level.
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and Tourism Index stocks, we construct ratios of the 
daily average quoted, and relative and effective bid- 
ask spreads over various time interval event win-
dows in the pre- and post-financial crises period. 
The quoted bid- ask spread is constructed because 
this measure of spread encapsulates the economic 
significance of the spread to the market- maker 
(Branch & Freed, 1977). The relative bid- ask spread 
is computed as the ask price minus the bid price 
divided by the midprice. However, as pointed out by 
Lee and Ready (1991), the relative bid- ask spread has 
two potential shortcomings. First, it overstates the 
trading costs of a stock because it fails to account for 
the tendency of prices to rise following a purchase 
and fall following a sale. Second, it can be argued 
that the relative bid- ask spread is an inappropriate 
measure of stock liquidity due to the fact that trades 
frequently occur within the ask and bid prices.
In our dataset, for instance, approximately 30% of 
trades occur within the midprice. Therefore, in order 
to account for these two shortcomings, we also com-
pute the effective bid- ask spread, defined at twice the 
absolute value of the difference between trade price 
and the prevailing midprice. There is, however, a 
potential problem with the use of either the relative 
or the effective bid- ask spread. The problem is that 
both measures of bid- ask spread will automatically 
increase, due to the increase in the midprice after the 
financial crises, witnessed in Table 1. Therefore, for 
completeness we also compute the quoted bid- ask 
spread defined as the ask price minus the bid price, 
before and after the financial crises trading period of 
Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index stocks.
In order to provide a comparison of the liquid-
ity of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index stocks 
before and after the financial crises, we construct 
ratios of daily relative, effective and quoted bid- ask 
spreads over various event time intervals to their 
equivalents in the pre- crises period over trading 
days [0, −90]. The results of the changes in liquid-
ity of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index stocks 
pre- and post-financial crises trading can be seen 
in Table 5. There is clear evidence from Table 4 that 
spreads are significantly reduced after the financial 
crises. For example, in the [−5, +5] event window, 
the mean and median quoted bid- ask spread ratios 
are 0.84 and highly significant. This indicates that 
spreads are significantly reduced over the 11- day 
Table 5. Short- and Long- Term Effects of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index Financial Crises Trading on Stock  
Market Liquidity
Stock market liquidity is measured by the quoted, relative, and effective bid- ask spreads of 25 Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index firms 
after the financial crises. Quoted bid- ask spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid price. Relative bid- ask spread is defined as the ask 
price minus the bid price divided by the quoted midprice. Effective bid- ask spread is defined as is defined as twice the absolute value of the 
difference between the transaction price and the midprice in effect at the time of the trade. All spread ratios are computed as the ratio of 
the average bid- ask spread of each individual stock over the indicated event time period to the average bid- ask spread measure over the 
pre- financial crises trading period of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index stocks [0, −90]. The null hypothesis that the mean of the reported 
ratio is equal to one is tested using a standard t- statistic.
Event time interval Quoted spread (%), mean (median) Relative spread (%), mean (median) Effective spread (%), mean (median)
[0, 0]
t-test
0.85 (0.86)
−4.15**
0.81 (0.80)
−4.23**
0.82 (0.81)
−4.19**
[−1, +1]
t-test
0.84 (0.84)
−4.01**
0.82 (0.81)
−4.04**
0.83 (0.82)
−3.99**
[−2, +2]
t-test
0.85 (0.86)
−4.31**
0.81 (0.80)
−4.29**
0.82 (0.81)
−4.25**
[−3, +3]
t-test
0.86 (0.86)
−3.87**
0.82 (0.81)
−3.99**
0.83 (0.82)
−3.95**
[−4, +4]
t-test
0.85 (0.86)
−4.13**
0.81 (0.81)
−4.09**
0.82 (0.82)
−4.04**
[−5, +5]
t-test
0.84 (0.84)
−3.90**
0.82 (0.81)
−3.92**
0.83 (0.83)
−3.87**
[0, +10]
t-test
0.88 (0.87)
−3.84**
0.84 (0.84)
−3.82**
0.85 (0.84)
−3.80**
[0, +30]
t-test
0.89 (0.88)
−3.76**
0.86 (0.85)
−3.70**
0.87 (0.88)
−3.72**
[0, +60]
t-test
0.93 (0.92)
−2.31**
0.90 (0.89)
−2.22**
0.91 (0.90)
−2.24**
[0, +90]
t-test
0.96 (0.95)
−2.06**
0.94 (0.93)
−2.02**
0.95 (0.94)
−2.00**
** Significant at 5% level.
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trading period centered on the first day after the 
financial crises. The results are robust across all 
liquidity measures.
The significant spread reductions over the longer 
event time intervals, such as [0, +60] and [0, +90], 
indicate that the reduction in trading costs is perma-
nent. This implies that the improvement in liquidity 
of the Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index stocks 
as a result of the financial crises is permanent.
4.4 Multivariate analysis of long- term changes in 
market liquidity
It is possible that the univariate analysis undertaken 
thus far in the study is based on factors unrelated 
to the impact of the financial crises to the Dow 
Jones Travel and Tourism Index. To control for 
these external factors and improve the power of the 
econometric analysis, we perform multivariate anal-
ysis of the bid- ask spread. The multivariate analy-
sis is undertaken in the form of a panel fixed effects 
estimator. Gregoriou, Ioannidis, and Skerratt (2005) 
report that the bid- ask spread increases with return 
volatility and decreases with stock price and trading 
volume in the London Stock Exchange. We estimate 
the following log- linear fixed effects model where 
the regression parameters represent elasticities:
 Liquidityjt = αj + β1Dt + β2Volumejt  
 + β3(Volumejt ∗ Dt) + β4Pricejt + β5StDevjt + εjt 
 for j = 1,2 . . . . . . . . ,25 and t = 1,2. (2)
Where t=1 corresponds to in the pre- crises trad-
ing of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index stocks, 
[0, −90], and t=2 corresponds to the post- crises 
trading period [0, +90]. The dependent variable 
Liquidityjt corresponds to either the quoted, relative, 
or effective bid- ask spread for stock j at time period 
t. Volume, Price, and StDev represent the traded vol-
ume in shares, closing price, and return volatility 
for stock j at time period t. The dummy variable Dt 
is equal to 1 in the post- crises time period and is 
equal to 0, otherwise. αj captures the time- invariant 
unobserved stock- specific fixed effects. The fixed- 
effect is accounting for differences in the initial level 
of liquidity of each security in our sample. We are 
mainly concerned with the change in the dummy 
variable β1 and the change in the slope of trading 
volume as a result of trading after the financial 
crises, β3. All variables apart from the dummy Dt are 
expressed as natural logarithms.
The fixed effects panel estimator, displayed in 
Equation 2, can be estimated with the use of Ordi-
nary Least Squares (OLS). The problem of OLS is 
that it does not account for the presence of endog-
eneity trading volume, stock price, and return vol-
atility. In order to capture endogeneity we use the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) panel 
estimator. The GMM estimator established by Arel-
lano and Bond (1991) uses internal instruments for 
each time period to deal with endogeneity.
For Equation 2 if E(eiteiz) = 0 holds for z ≠ t across 
all the securities then it represents the following 
moment conditions:
 E(yi,t − z∆eit) = 0 for z ≥ 1; t = 1,2.
If the explanatory variables in Equation 2 are 
weakly exogenous, then we also have the following 
additional moment conditions:
 E(Xi,t − z∆eit) = 0 for z ≥ 1; t = 1,2.
The single equation GMM panel estimator gen-
erally specifies a dynamic panel model in first dif-
ferences and exploits the above moment conditions. 
Therefore, the lagged (one time period or more) 
levels of endogenous and weakly endogenous vari-
ables of the model become appropriate instruments 
for addressing endogeneity. The single GMM panel 
estimator provides consistent coefficient estimates.
The panel estimation of Equation 2 with the use 
of GMM is displayed in Table 6. The first thing to 
report is that the panel passes all the relevant diag-
nostic tests. The fixed effect of the panel is signif-
icant with a p- value of zero, suggesting that the 
differences in the initial levels of liquidity of the 
stocks in our sample are successful captured by 
the panel estimator. The test for first order residual 
serial correlation is insignificant, suggesting that 
the panel does not suffer from autocorrelation. The 
residuals of the panel are also normally distributed, 
signaling that the results of the panel are not due to 
outliers in the data. Finally the results of the Sargan 
test confirm the validity of the instruments in the 
GMM model.
The R2 indicates that 67% of the variation in 
market liquidity is accounted for in the model. The 
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variables Price, Volume, and StDev have the predicted 
signs and are highly significant. A more important 
result is that the parameter β1 is statistically sig-
nificant whereas, the parameter β3 is insignificant. 
The significance of Dt shows that the effective bid- 
ask spread decreases on average by 10.15% in the 
post- crises period, after controlling for the impact 
of trading volume, share prices, and volatility. Vol-
atility has a positive and significant sign that agrees 
with the market microstructure literature. Essen-
tially this implies that as market makers are faced 
with greater risk they increase their compensation 
for providing a financial market for the trade to 
occur. Also the coefficient estimates on the trading 
volume (Volumejt) is significant. This implies that a 
1% increase in mean trading volume (Volumejt) is 
associated with a decrease of 8.12% in the average 
effective bid- ask spread in the pre- crises period. The 
insignificance in the (Volumejt * Dt) interaction term 
signals that this increase in trading volume is main-
tained in the post- crises period.
From our findings we observe that after the finan-
cial crises, there was a significant permanent increase 
in the trading volume and the stock price liquidity 
of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index stocks. This 
finding holds in both a univariate and multivariate 
framework, even when the impact of share prices, 
trading volume and volatility of the stocks has been 
accounted for.
The above analysis reveals that the financial crisis, 
even the negative consequences on the economic 
and social life, did not severely affect the tourism 
industry. Admittedly, households budgets were 
restrained, however, there was not a restriction on 
tourism spending because people continue going 
for holidays (Alegre et al., 2013). The results pro-
vide useful insight for the governments, firms, and 
employees that in case of an economic turbulence, 
the tourism industry remains unaffected.
5.0 Conclusion
The financial crises in the banking sector between 
2007– 2009 has resulted in a global financial cri-
ses on the travel and tourism industry, revealed by 
examining the Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index 
stocks before and after the financial crises.
Table 6. A Multivariate Analysis of the Long- Term Impact on Stock Market Liquidity
Liquidityjt = αj + β1Dt + β2Volumejt + β3(Volumejt * Dt) + β4Pricejt + β5StDevjt + εjt
for j = 1,2 . . . . . . . . ,25 and t = 1,2.
Where t=1 corresponds to the pre- financial crises trading of Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index stocks [0, −90], and t=2 corresponds to 
the post- financial crises trading period [0, +90]. The dependent variable, Liquidityjt corresponds to either the quoted, relative, or effective 
bid- ask spread for stock j at time period t. Quoted bid- ask spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid price. Relative bid- ask spread is 
defined as the ask price minus the bid price divided by the quoted midprice. Effective bid- ask spread is defined as twice the absolute value 
of the difference between the transaction price and the midprice in effect at the time of the trade. Volume, Price, and StDev represent the 
traded volume in shares, closing price, and return volatility for stock j at time period t. The dummy variable Dt is equal to 1 in the post- 
financial crises time period and is equal to 0, otherwise. All the variables apart from Dt are expressed as natural logarithms. αj captures the 
time- invariant unobserved stock- specific fixed effects. AR(1) is the first order Lagrange Multiplier test performed on the first difference 
of the residuals because of the transformations involved. Sargan tests follow a x2 distribution with r degrees of freedom under the null 
hypothesis of valid instruments. NORM (2) is the p- value for the Jarque- Bera normality test. The endogenous explanatory variables (all 
variables apart from Dt) in the panel are GMM instrumented setting z ≥ 1 [.] are p values and (.) are t-statistics.
Variables Quoted bid- ask spread Relative bid- ask spread Effective bid- ask spread
Constant −0.886 (−10.23)** −0.923 (−11.24)** −0.925 (−11.26)**
D −9.15 (−11.52)** −9.63 (−12.98)** −10.15 (−13.63)**
Volume −7.31 (−8.93)** −7.16 (−8.97)** −8.12 (−8.94)**
(Volume*D) 0.024 (1.04) 0.025 (1.05) 0.026 (1.03)
Price −2.361 (−70.21)** −2.357 (−70.23)** −2.350 (−70.33)**
StDev 0.782 (17.23)** 0.791 (18.21)** 0.790 (18.26)**
αj [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
R2 0.571 0.574 0.670
NORM (2) [0.231] [0.234] [0.237]
AR(1) [0.421] [0.424] [0.427]
Sargan x2 (r) [0.458]  [0.510]  [0.513]
** Significant at the 5% level.
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Our empirical findings reveal that there is a long- 
term enhancement in liquidity of Dow Jones Travel 
and Tourism Index stocks post-financial crises trad-
ing that persists over a three- month trading inter-
val. We also find permanent increases in the stock 
price and trading volume of Dow Jones Travel and 
Tourism Index stocks after the financial crises. Fur-
ther, we observe a significant increase in analyst 
coverage for Dow Jones Travel and Tourism Index 
shares after the financial crises. This results in signif-
icant decreases in bid- ask spreads in the post- crises 
period, after controlling for the impact of stock 
prices, trading volume, and volatility of returns.
5.1 Managerial implications
The research results add to the existing tourism liter-
ature and can be useful to tourism practitioners and 
are extremely striking because they go against the 
principles of financial theory. In a period of financial 
crises, we would expect significant declines in travel 
and tourism. This is because the failure of business 
and less disposable income for individuals should 
result in dramatic decreases for both business and 
leisure travelers. In our opinion, our results should 
change the perspective in which travel and tourism 
should be viewed. It is no longer a luxury item but 
more a necessity to stimulate business and happi-
ness for firms and individuals, respectively, in times 
of financial turmoil. Given the lack of literature ana-
lyzing tourism during the financial crises, we believe 
the findings in our paper cannot be ignored.
In particular, destinations should prioritize tourism 
as a remedy in case of a financial crisis and to be the 
industry of focus for economic recovery. As men-
tioned above, people even in tight economic condi-
tions are traveling with a plethora of choices suited 
to all budgets. The industry has undergone a meta-
morphosis over the last decades and offered a pleth-
ora of products and activities. Additionally, tourism 
is considered as a vital and an essential activity and 
this should be considered so tourism destinations 
and suppliers can be proactive and respond strategi-
cally with more products and services for the future 
(Alegre & Pou, 2016). Governments should frame 
contractive policies and strategies in order to ensure 
the economic viability of the tourism industry 
that positively impacts the social life. An import-
ant aspect is the focus on quality tourism products 
that provide constructive experiences (Lopes et al., 
2014). Quality positively impacts customers’ satis-
faction and if they become loyal to destinations and 
firms (Kim, 2017).
Finally, the results of the study are insightful to 
the firms that invest in the tourism industry. The 
investments provide high returns because of cur-
rent trends with an increased number of travelers. 
The permanent rise in liquidity of Dow Jones Travel 
and Tourism Index stocks could result in increase in 
firm value. This is because it may be less costly for 
them to borrow, issue capital, or issue public equity 
after the increase in liquidity resulting from online 
trading. Extensions that focus on valuation of Dow 
Jones Travel and Tourism Index firms after the intro-
duction of online trading are promising avenues for 
future research. Also we could compare the impact 
of the tourism industry pre and post Brexit.
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